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I. INTRODUCTION
This appeal was filed by St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center (Hospital)
from the denial of county assistance to Megan Freeman (Patient). On appeal, the Hospital
maintains that the Board of County Commissioners of Gooding County's (Board) decision is not
supported by substantial and competent evidence and is erroneous as a matter of law. The Board
denied benefits to the Patient, finding that the Patient was not medically indigent. Testimony
and evidence in the record demonstrates that the Patient does not have sufficient, available
sources to pay for her medical costs and is eligible for benefits under the statute.
The Patient is a stay-at-home mother of two young children, ages 5 years and 18 months,
and is supported entirely by her husband. (Agency Hearing Tr. p. 39; 45). The Patient's only
source of income is her husband's income from his employment at Lithia Motors, where Robert
Freeman earns $8.00 an hour as a sales representative. (Agency Hearing Tr. p. 39; 45). The
parties stipulated that Mr. Freeman's monthly gross income is $1433.01, a figure used by
Medicaid in July 2007 (three months after the Patient's hospitalization) when the Patient applied
for health insurance for her two children. (Agency Hearing Tr. p. 65 and Agency R. Hospital Ex.
11). Beyond the income the Patient receives from her husband's employment, the Patient has no
other resources, save an automobile that the County deemed exempt under Idaho Code (I.C.) 313502(17). (Agency Hearing Tr. p. 29; 47).
The total medical costs from the Patient's hospitalization exceed $19,000. (Agency
Hearing Tr. p. 31 and Agency R. Hospital Ex. 4). I.C. 31-3502(17) provides that resources shall
include the applicant's ability to pay for medical costs over a period of up to five (5) years. In
order to pay for her medical costs within a 60 month time frame, the Patient needs monthly
income in excess of $330 after payment of necessary living expenses.
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The testimony and evidence in the record demonstrates that the Patient's monthly
expenses exceed $1900 after payment of rent, food, clothing, and other necessary non-food
items. (Agency Hearing Tr. p. 31). Calculation of the Patient's monthly income and expenses
demonstrates that the Patient does not have sufficient, available resources to pay for her medical
expenses. Even if Robert Freeman's monthly gross income is used for purposes of determining
the Patient's available income, the record demonstrates that the Patient is incurring debt in an
amount in excess of $400 each month after payment of necessary living expenses and cannot pay
for her medical costs within 60 months.
11. ARGUMENT
A.

The Ability to E m Income Is Not a Resource Under I.C. 3 1-3502(17)
Respondent argues that the Patient could pay for her medical costs if she obtained

employment. Respondent maintains that the Patient is not a disabled person and is voluntarily
unemployed. Respondent argues that the Patient's ability to e m income is an available resource
and may be considered in determining whether the Patient is medically indigent. Respondent
urges this Court to find that the "ability to earn income" is a resource under I.C. 31-3502(17).
The relevant provisions of I.C. 31-3502(17) provide as follows:
"Resources" means all property, whether tangible or intangible, real or personal,
liquid or nonliquid, including, but not limited to, all forms of public assistance,
crime victims compensation, worker's compensation, veterans benefits, medicaid,
medicare and any other property from any source for which an applicant andlor an
obligated person may be eligible or in which he or she may have an interest.
Resources shall include the ability of an applicant and obligated persons to pay
for necessary medical services over a period of up to five (5) years. For purposes
of determining approval for medical indigency only, resources shall not include
the value of the homestead on the applicant or obligated person's residence, a
burial plot, exemptions for personal property allowed in section 11-605(1)
through (3), Idaho Code, and additional exemptions allowed by county resolution.
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Nothing in the language of I.C. 31-3502(17) provides that a county may consider an
applicant's "ability to earn income" a resource in making a determination of medical indigence.
The focus of I.C. 31-3502(17) is on assets and upon an applicant's interest in all forms of public
assistance. While it is clear that income from employment is a resource, it is far from clear that
potential income from employment that the applicant does not have qualifies as a resource.
Plainly, the language of I.C. 31-3502(17) does not expressly provide that an applicant's "ability
to earn income" is a resource. Although I.C. 3 1-3502(17) does provide that resources include the
applicant's ability to pay for medical costs over a period of up to five (5) years, the "resources"
described in that part are clearly making reference to resources described in the preceding
sentence. The "ability to earn income" is not one of the resources described.
While it is true that I.C. 31-3502(17) provides that resources includes, "all property,
whether tangible or intangible, real or personal, liquid or nonliquid, including, but not limited to,
all forms of public assistance...and any other property from any source for which an applicant
andlor an obligated person may be eligible or in which he or she may have an interest from
whatever source. . ..", it is also a well-settled rule of statutory construction that where general
words of a statute follow an enumeration of persons or things, the general words must be of the
same or similar class or character to those which are specifically enumerated. See, State v.
Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482 (2003). The phrase "including but not limited to", which follows the
words "all property, whether tangible or intangible, real or personal, liquid or nonliquid.. ." is a
general term. See, Kuvujecz at 485. Thus, in order for the "ability to earn income" to be
considered a resource under I.C. 31-3502(17), the "ability to earn income" must be of the same
or similar class or character as the items specifically enumerated in the statute.
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The "ability to earn income" is not of the same or similar class or character as the
resources specifically enumerated in I.C. 31-3502(17). I.C. 31-3502(17) defines resources as
"property", "all forms of public assistance" and "any other property from any source" in which
the applicant may be eligible or in which [applicant] may have an interest. An applicant's
"ability to earn income" is clearly not property or a property interest. Similarly, an applicant's
ability to earn income is not a form of public assistance or property in which the applicant may
be eligible.
Although the Board found that the Patient had the ability to earn income and was
required to seek employment in order to pay for her medical costs, nothing in the language of
I.C. 31-3502(17) actually compels or supports that finding.
B.

Income from Prospective Emvlovment Is Not An Available Resource
Similarly, Idaho case law demonstrates that the Board erred in finding that the Patient's

ability to earn income is a resource for purposes of determining medical indigence. I.C. 313502(1) defines medical indigence as follows:
Medically indigent means any person who is in need of necessary medical services and
who, if an adult, together with his or her spouse...does not have income or resources
available to him from whatever source sufficient to pay for necessary medical services.
In construing which resources may be considered "available" for purposes of determining
medical indigence under I.C. 31-3502(1), this Court has held that the term "available" resource
denotes immediately obtainable income or resources and a corresponding present ability to pay,
as opposed to a future ability to pay. See, Application of Ackerman, 127 Idaho 495 (1995) and

University of Utah Hosp. and Medical Ctr. v. Twin Falls County, 122 Idaho 1010 1992).
The record demonstrates that the Patient does not have immediately obtainable income or
resources or a corresponding present ability to pay for her medical expenses. The Patient cannot
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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use her "ability to earn income" from prospective employment to presently pay for her medical
costs. In order to have the present ability to pay for her medical costs, the Patient presently
needs a job, a wage from her employment and available income each month after the payment of
necessary living expenses.
The record demonstrates that the Patient does not have available resources to presently
pay for her medical costs. The Patient was incurring debt in excess of $400 each month after
payment of necessary living expenses when the application was made.
In addition, this Court has previously held that a patient's interest in prospective
resources is not an available resource for purposes of determining medical indigence. See,

University of Utah Hosp. and Medical Ctr. v. Twin Falls County, 122 Idaho 1010 (1992). While
this Court's decision in University of Utah Hospital involved a patient's prospective interest in
SSI benefits, the holding in University of Utah Hospital should apply with equal force to a
patient's interest in other prospective resources, including income from employment the patient
is not yet earning.
C.

Counties Mav Reauire the Emulovment of Auvlicants For Reimbursement
It is important to note that the only statutory provision that expressly provides for

consideration of the patient's ability to work is set forth in the section of Idaho's Medical
Indigence Act governing reimbursement after a claim is approved. I.C. 3 1-3510A expressly
provides as follows:
3 1-3510A REIMBURSEMENT
(1) Receipt of financial assistance pursuant to this chapter shall obligate an
applicant to reimburse the county from which assistance is received and the
catastrophic health care costs program for such reasonable portion of the financial
assistance paid on behalf of the applicant as the board may determine that the
applicant is able to pay from resources over a reasonable period of time. Cash
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amounts received shall be prorated between the county and the state in proportion
to the amount each has paid.

(6) The board may require the employment of such of the medically indigent as
are capable and able to work and whose attending physician certifies they are
capable of working.
Significantly, both the District Court and the Board failed to reference this section in finding that
the statute permitted consideration of an applicant's ability to work in determining eligibility for
benefits. This is the only section in Idaho's Medical Indigence Act that expressly provides for
consideration of an applicant's ability to work in the indigence process.
This section is significant for purposes of this appeal in at least two respects. First, it
demonstrates the legislature's intent to provide for payment of claims where the patient has the
ability to work but chooses not to do so. The legislature has given counties a mechanism to
secure reimbursement once the claim is approved by permitting counties to require employment
by the patient. Second, this section demonstrates that the certification of the ability to work
requirement, which was referenced in the prior version of I.C. 3 1-3404 and which was part of the
old eligibility process, is now part of the reimbursement process. As a means of obtaining
reimbursement from patients after a claim is approved, counties may now require patients to
obtain employment. The certification to work requirement is no longer part of the eligibility
process.
To the extent that Respondent argues that the certification requirement described in prior
statutory versions of the Medical Indigence Act shows that the ability to work is a proper
consideration in evaluating present eligibility for assistance, that argument is not supported by
the present version of I.C. 31-3510A.
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D.

Counties Have An Affirmative Duty to Care for Their Medically Indigent Residents
Respondent also argues that the Hospital's position is contrary to the general purpose of

Idaho's Medical Indigence Act. Respondent argues that I.C. 31-3501 requires individuals to
demonstrate self-reliance to the maximum extent possible. Respondent maintains that requiring
patients who are capable of working to obtain employment furthers the underlying purposes of
the Act. Respondent claims that the Hospital's interpretation of the statute thwarts the express
purposes set forth in I.C. 3 1-3501.
This Court has previously interpreted the meaning of the language set forth in I.C. 313501. LC. 31-3501 provides as follows:
It is the policy of this state that each person, to the maximum extent possible, is
responsible for his or her own medical care and to that end, shall be encouraged to
purchase his or her own medical insurance with coverage sufficient to prevent
them from needing to request assistance pursuant to this chapter. However, in
order to safeguard the public health, safety and welfare, and to provide suitable
facilities and provisions for the care and hospitalization of persons in this state,
and, in the case of medically indigent persons, to provide for the payment thereof,
the respective counties of this state, the administrator and the department shall
have the duties and powers as hereinafter provided.
In interpreting the language set forth in this section of the Act, this Court has stated that the
language contained in I.C. 31-3501 is merely hortatory. See, Bonner General Hospital v. Bonner

County, 133 Idaho 7 (1999). In other words, it merely encourages individuals to purchase
insurance and to exercise self-reliance to the maximum extent possible.
On the other hand, this Court has held that the directives contained in I.C. 31-3503 are
mandatory. See, Bonner General Hospital at 10. I.C. 31-3503 provides as follows:
[that counties shall] [clare for and maintain the medically indigent resident of
their counties as provided in this chapter up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per
claim in the aggregate over a twelve (12) month period.
I.C. 3 1-3503 specifically requires counties to care for their medically indigent residents.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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E.

The Parties Have Reciprocal Duties with Respect to Burden of Proof
Respondent also argues that the Hospital has failed to meet its burden of proof in

demonstrating that the Patient is medically indigent. Respondent maintains that the burden of
proof remained with the I-Iospital to demonstrate that work was unavailable during times when
the Patient's husband was not working. The Hospital disagrees with Respondent's position.
The Hospital demonstrated that the Patient was medically indigent. The Hospital offered
evidence on the following issues: First, the Hospital demonstrated that the Patient had no
income and that her only source of income was her husband's income. (Agency Hearing Tr. p.
39; 45). This resulted in a stipulation that the Patient's household income was $1,433.01.
(Agency Hearing Tr. p. 65).
Second, the Hospital demonstrated that the Patient's monthly expenses exceeded $1,900
a month.

(Agency Hearing Tr. 31). There was no initial dispute regarding the Patient's

expenses. The parties later disputed whether a garnishment should be included in the Patient's
expenses. The Hospital has not made an issue regarding the garnishment, because, assuming the
Patient is not required to seek employment, whether the garnishment is likely to be satisfied in
several months does not impact the Patient's eligibility.

Even if the garnishment is not

considered, the Patient's income would still be insufficient to pay for her monthly living
expenses and would be far less than she would need to pay for her medical costs over a 60 month
time frame.
Third, although the Hospital disputes that the Patient's ability to earn income is a
resource, the Hospital also offered evidence that the Patient could work a minimum wage job
during regular business hours. (Agency Hearing Tr. p. 46; 47 and 61). However, the Hospital
also demonstrated that any additional income from such employment would be offset by the
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additional child care costs that would result from placing the Patient's children in daycare.
(Agency Nearing Tr. p. 46; 47 and 61).
Respondent argued that any additional child care costs could be avoided if the Patient
found employment after regular business hours when her husband returned from work.
Respondent then argues that the Hospital had the burden to prove that no work was available
during these hours to argue that such employment is not a resource. The Hospital takes issue
with Respondent's position for three reasons.
First, the Hospital demonstrated that the Patient did not have the present ability to pay for
her medical expenses over a 60 month time frame. This should have triggered the Board's
obligation to approve the claim. If the Board believed that the Patient should be required to seek
employment, that was a remedy available to the Board as a means of reimbursement after the
claim was approved per I.C. 3 1-3510A.
Second, the Hospital demonstrated that the Patient is already employed as a full-time
stay-at-home mother.

As a matter of policy, the Patient should not be required to place her

children in daycare in order to qualify for needed medical benefits. This is particularly true
where counties have an obligation to care for their medically indigent residents and are given a
substantial array of tools under the statute to protect the county's resources, tools that are not
given to hospitals, e.g., the county lien, the reimbursement provisions, subrogation rights, etc.
Third, the Hospital made a prima facie case of indigence. Counties are not permitted to
place the entire burden of proving indigence and the entire risk non-payment on the provider.

See, IHC Hospital, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners of Twin Falls County, 108 Idaho 136, 697
P.2d 1150 (1985) (overruled on other grounds, Intermountain Health Care, Inc v. Board o f

Commissioners of Caribou County, 108 Idaho 757, 702 P.2d 795 (1985)). The Hospital
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demonstrated that the Patient did not have the present ability to pay for her medical expenses.
Respondent offered almost no evidence that employment was available. Respondent simply
argued that the Patient should "go get a job", and placed the entire burden of rebutting every
possible inference regarding available employment on the Hospital.
The Hospital acknowledges that it has the initial burden of proof to demonstrate medical
indigence. See, Salinas v. Canyon' County, 117 Idaho 218 (1990). However, once a prima facie
case is established, the burden must shift to the County to rebut the Hospital's claim. Id. at 221.
In the instant proceeding, the burden always remained with the Hospital; the County required the
Hospital to do the very thing this Court has stated is not required: proving medical indigence and
rebutting all reasonable inferences to the contrary. See, IHC Hospital at 136 and Id at 221.
F.

The Board's Findings Are Not Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence
Finally, the Hospital would like this Court to note that the Board's findings are not

supported by substantial and competent evidence. First, the Board found that Robert Freeman's

net income was $1,433.01. (Agency R, Final Determination, dated October 2, 2008, paragraph
12). This is clear error. The prosecutor stipulated that Mr. Freeman's gross income was
$1,433.01. (Agency Hearing Tr. 65). The prosecutor also filed a document with the Court
acknowledging that this stipulation was made. (Agency R. Notice to the Court

). Yet,

the Board still found that the $1,433.01 figure represented net income. This is significant as

gross income includes income that will be subject to a tax. The portion of Mr. Freeman's
income which is deducted as taxable income may not be considered an "available" resource for
purposes of making a medical indigence determination. The Board used these gross income
figures to calculate to future tax refunds and available income. The stipulation reached by the
parties is a contract and was binding on the County. See, Kohring v. Robertson, 137 Idaho 94,
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99,44 P.3d 1149, 1154 (2002)(quoting Conley v. Whittlesey, 126 Idaho 630, 633, 888 P.2d 804,
807 (Ct.App.1995)).
Second, the Board found that the Patient would receive a tax refund in the amount of
$4,000 next year. (Agency R., Final Determination, dated October 2, 2008, paragraph 15). This
finding directly contradicted the Patient's testimony. The Patient specifically testified that she
did not know if she would receive a tax refund next year or the amount of any such refund.
(Agency Hearing Tr. p. 50; 57). There was no evidence to the contrary introduced by the County
to rebut this testimony. The Board's findings in this regard therefore represented clear error.
Finally, the Board made a number of other calculations regarding imputed income and
expenses that are also not supported by the record. (Agency R., Final Determination, October 2,
2008, paragraphs 6, 10, 11 and 12). Nowhere in the record is there evidence regarding the
various potential income calculations the Board made regarding tbe Patient's ability to earn
income. (Agency R., Final Determination, October 2,2008, paragraphs 6, 10, 11 and 12).
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111. CONCLUSION
The County has made a substantial effort to deny this claim. Many of the findings made
by the Board plainly are not supported by substantial and competent evidence and are erroneous
as a matter of law. Based on all of the foregoing points and authorities, the Hospital urges this
Court to REVERSE the Board's decision.
DATED this

day of October 2009.

STEVEN B. PITTS
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant
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